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anks in countries around the world importantly
contribute to economic growth and develop-
ment.They do so by contributing to a country’s pay-
ments mechanism and credit system. For this reason
banks are among the most regulated firms in coun-
tries everywhere.This certainly is the case for banks
in the United States.Yet, the US subprime mortgage
market meltdown and the associated credit crunch
that emerged in 2007 underscored the need to
reform the current regulatory structure. President
Bush signed into law the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act in July 2008, mainly to provide relief
to homeowners facing foreclosure and thereby
lessen downward pressure on home prices and limit
the curtailment of credit. However, this Act alone is
not enough to promote a more efficient, stable and
competitive banking industry. Given these develop-
ments,it is an opportune time to examine the current
US regulatory structure and to discuss ways in which
it could be reformed to be more efficient and more
appropriate for today’s banking industry.
How we got to where we are
The current bank regulatory structure is outlined in
Figure 1. It is clear that there are multiple and over-
lapping regulatory authorities that contribute to
inconsistent and costly regulation. The lack of a
comprehensive design is due to the fact that, as
Figure 2 shows, the regulatory structure is the out-
come of a series of piecemeal actions taken in
response to discrete events over the past two cen-
turies. It is therefore essential to note the more
important developments to understand how the US
got to where it is today.
Bank regulation developed in a unique fashion
because the US started as a confederation of con-
stituent states.This led to a dual regulatory system in
which both the states and the federal government
charter and regulate banks. Conflicts led to this situ-
ation being suspended for a short period of time,
however. In 1791 the US Congress chartered a fed-
eral bank for twenty years to act as a central bank
and then did the same thing again in 1816, but state
opposition each time led to the charters not being
renewed (Spong 1994,15).This took the federal gov-
ernment completely out of the bank chartering and
regulation business until the US Office of the Comp-
troller of Currency (OCC) was established in 1863 to
charter and regulate national banks.
Since commercial banks did not seek smaller de-
positors and provide mortgages in their early years,
mutual savings banks were established in 1816 and
savings and loans (S&Ls) in 1831 to provide each of
these services, respectively. Lastly, credit unions
were established in 1909 to provide basic financial
services, but only to qualifying members.These are
the four types of depositories that still exist in the
US today.
After the Civil War,the US suffered several banking
panics that led to the establishment of the Federal
Reserve System (Fed) in 1913 to provide liquidity to
the financial sector. It also has regulatory authority
over some banks.
During the Great Depression, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established to
convince depositors that their funds were always
safe, and thereby prevent “runs” on banks. These
occurred when large numbers of depositors thought
their banks were in trouble. They would rush to
withdrawal deposits and thereby drive even sound
banks into insolvency by being forced to sell assets
at depressed prices.Also, the National Banking Act
of 1933, or Glass-Steagall Act, was enacted to sepa-
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to minimize conflicts of interest that might arise
between the two activities. At the same time, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was
established to promote the disclosure of all materi-
al information to potential investors when firms
seek to raise funds from the public. To accomplish
this task it was given regulatory authority over
investment banks.
After bank holding companies came into existence,
the Bank Holding Company Acts of 1956 and 1970
were enacted to restrict the non-banking activities of
corporations controlling one or more banks.The Fed
was given responsibility for regulating such corpora-
tions (BHCs) and for determining which non-bank-
ing activities are allowed.1
In response to the S&L crisis that began in 1980, the
US Congress passed the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act the same
year and the Garn-St Germain Act in 1982.These two
laws expanded the powers of savings and loans,
mutual savings banks and credit unions, and thereby
blurred the historical distinctions that had existed
among them. The motivation for the laws was the
belief that if these institutions became more like
banks that had largely avoided the S&L crisis, future
problems would be prevented. But in so doing the
rationale for maintaining sepa-
rate regulatory authorities for
the different types of depository
institutions was undermined.
Laws were subsequently enact-
ed to reduce the restrictions on
the location of a bank’s offices.
Each state specifies its own
branching restrictions for banks.
However, when first estab-
lished, national banks were not
allowed to have any branches.
The McFadden Act of 1927
changed this by allowing a na-
tional bank to follow the
branching rules of the state in
which it is located, though pro-
hibiting branching across state
lines. The Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956 prohibited BHCs from circum-
venting interstate restrictions through acquisitions
across state boundaries.
Then, in 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act (“Riegle-Neal”)
repealed the McFadden Act and allowed BHCs to
acquire a bank in any state.2 Furthermore,beginning
on 1 June 1997, a BHC was free to consolidate its
interstate banks into a branch network, and banks
were allowed to branch across state lines through
acquisitions and turning the acquired bank into a
branch. De novo branching was also permissible,
provided state law authorized it.
Like Riegle-Neal, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA) of 1999 was also a struggle to counter
restrictive laws. It repealed significant parts of the
Glass-Steagall Act separating commercial banking
from the securities business, as well as parts of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 separating
commercial banking from the insurance business
(Barth, Brumbaugh and Wilcox 2000). Thus, GLBA
permits a financial services holding company to offer
banking, securities and insurance, but the mixing of
banking and commerce is strictly prohibited.
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Figure 1
1To promote a level playing field,the International Banking Act of
1978 (IBA) was adopted so that foreign banks would be treated the
same as domestic banks, so-called national treatment.
2 The conditions are as follows: 1) the bank holding company
(BHC) must be adequately capitalized and adequately managed;2)
the BHC’s community reinvestment record must pass a review by
the Federal Reserve Board; 3) the acquisition must not leave the
acquiring company in control of more than 10 percent of nation-
wide deposits or 30 percent of deposits in the state;and 4) the bank
to be acquired must meet any age requirement (i.e., in terms of








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2The subprime mortgage market meltdown results in
still more changes
The “subprime mortgage market crisis” began in
early 2007 as foreclosure rates on newly originated
mortgages rose rapidly and several subprime lenders
declared bankruptcy. Things worsened in the sum-
mer of 2007 when two Bear Stearns’ hedge funds,
heavily invested in securities tied to mortgages, col-
lapsed. Furthermore, declining home prices, rising
foreclosures, and increasing credit losses led to a
credit crunch. Tallying up the results through 4
August 2008, the US subprime home mortgage mar-
ket was at the epicenter of a crisis that had resulted
in $483 billion in losses/write downs at banks and
other financial firms and $353 billion in capital
raised from new and existing shareholders (Barth,
Li, Phumiwasana and Yago 2008).
In response to this troubling situation, President
Bush pushed for a voluntary freeze on interest rates
in December 2007 for a select group of roughly
600,000 borrowers with subprime mortgages in an
effort to prevent foreclosures. Then, in February
2008, he signed into law the Economic Stimulus Act
that provided tax rebates to taxpayers,tax incentives
to stimulate business investment and an increase in
the limits imposed on mortgages eligible for pur-
chase by the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac). The Housing and Eco-
nomic Recovery Act was then enacted in July 2008
authorizing the Federal Housing Authority (FHA)
to guarantee up to $300 billion in new 30-year fixed
rate mortgages for subprime borrowers if lenders
voluntarily write down principal loan balances to 90
percent of current appraisal value. The Act also
established a single regulator – the Federal Housing
Finance Agency – for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and
the Federal Home Loan Banks and provides tempo-
rary authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to
lend to or purchase stock in Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac in any amount deemed necessary to prevent
their insolvency.
It is essential to understand some of the important
changes that have taken place in US mortgage mar-
kets over the past three decades and how they have
contributed to this dire situation. Prior to 1980, the
vast majority of all home mortgage loans were made
by savings and loans. These institutions originated,
serviced (i.e., collecting principal and interest pay-
ments), and held these loans in portfolios. As early
as 1970, however, the combining of these three func-
tions within a single institution began to change, as
home mortgage loans were increasingly securitized
by the Government National Mortgage Association
(Ginnie Mae), Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. In-
deed, these three agencies securitized only 1 percent
of all outstanding mortgages in 1965, but nearly
50 percent in 2008.
Securitization contributed to the unbundling of the
home mortgage process insofar as savings and loans
no longer had to hold these mortgages in their port-
folios. Investors in the securities backed by home
mortgages also provided an additional source of
funding beyond the deposits of savings and loans.
The origination and servicing of mortgages also
became separate functions not entirely performed
by savings and loans. The unbundling of the home
mortgage process into these three separate functions
(funding, origination and servicing) meant there
were also three separate sources of revenue, with
only those providing funding (i.e., lenders or inves-
tors in mortgage-backed securities) for home mort-
gage loans bearing any credit risk.
The financial innovations of securitization and
adjustable-rate mortgages contributed to the mod-
ernization of the US mortgage markets by providing
more diverse sources of funding for home mortgages
and a wider choice of mortgage products for con-
sumers. Increased use of adjustable-rate mortgages
also allowed the sharing of interest risk by both
lenders and borrowers. Those individuals choosing
adjustable-rate mortgages typically receive an initial
interest rate lower than one for a fixed-rate mort-
gage, but then face the prospect of higher rates if
market interest rates rise.The development and wide
use of credit scores for individual borrowers and
credit ratings for individual issuances of mortgage-
backed securities, moreover, is supposed to provide
more information for lenders, borrowers and in-
vestors to better assess and price risk.
In recent years,subprime home mortgage loans grew
rapidly. Indeed, the subprime share of total origina-
tions was less than 5 percent in 1994, increased to
13 percent in 2000, and then further grew to more
than 20 percent in both 2005 and 2006 before declin-
ing to 7.9 percent in 2007 as the crisis unfolded.
Furthermore, the share of subprime originations
packaged into mortgage-backed securities more
than doubled over the same seven-year period, from
31.6 percent to 80.5 percent. Securitization of home
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mortgage loans, moreover, was no longer overwhel-
mingly dominated by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and
Freddie Mac. Home mortgage loans securitized by
non-agency entities grew rapidly from $386 billion in
2000 to $2.1 trillion in 2007.
In 2007, as noted earlier, substantial problems began
to emerge in the subprime loan market when several
subprime mortgage lenders filed for bankruptcy and
other financial firms suffered heavy losses on sub-
prime securities, and credit and liquidity problems
spread throughout the financial sector. The majority
of these losses were triggered by the increasing rate
of foreclosures on subprime loans from 2000 to
March 2008. Indeed, more than half of all the nearly
1 million homes in foreclosure at year-end 2007,
moreover, involved subprime loans. More generally,
FitchResearch (2008) estimates that the total market
loss of the subprime mortgage crisis will be $400 bil-
lion to $550 billion (by comparison, the savings and
loan crisis cost $408 billion in 2007 dollars, of which
82 percent was borne by taxpayers). This trouble-
some situation has led to many condemnations of
subprime mortgage loans and securitization.
Instead of criticizing the use of subprime mortgage
loans, actions should focus on better educating con-
sumers on complex loan products and simplifying the
documents necessary for informed decision-making.
After all,consumers must be allowed to choose mort-
gage products, even if some expose borrowers to
interest-rate risk.Also,there should be greater trans-
parency for loans made on the basis of less stringent
origination practices, such as making loans on the
basis of no down payments and stated rather than
verified income, so that investors in such loans or
securities backed by them have better knowledge
about the risk-return tradeoffs of alternative invest-
ments. In addition, investors in mortgage-backed
securities ultimately must engage in their own due
diligence rather than solely relying on rating agencies
to assess the quality of the underlying collateral.
Furthermore, and most importantly, the regulatory
authorities have a responsibility to take more timely
and cost-effective actions in response to a developing
crisis, rather than acting after a crisis is apparent to
everyone, which all too frequently is the case.
Still further reform is needed
Further bank regulatory reform is surely needed as
Treasury Secretary Paulson indicated in March 2008
with the issuance of the Blueprint for A Modernized
Financial Regulatory Structure. The Treasury pro-
posal consists of two parts: short-term and interme-
diate-term recommendations.The short-term recom-
mendations include the following:
• Expanding the president’s working group (PWG)
on financial markets to promote greater coordi-
nation and communication in four distinct areas:
– Mitigating systemic risk to the financial system,
– Enhancing financial market integrity,
– Promoting consumer and investor protection,
– and supporting capital markets efficiency and
competitiveness.
• Addressing the mortgage origination problems by:
– Establishing a new federal commission, the
Mortgage Origination Commission (MOC).
– Enacting federal legislation to set forth (or
provide authority to the MOC to develop) uni-
form minimum licensing qualification stan-
dards for state mortgage market participants.
These should include personal conduct and
disciplinary history, minimum educational
requirements, testing criteria and procedures,
and appropriate license revocation standards.
The MOC would also evaluate,rate,and report
on the adequacy of each state’s system for
licensing and regulation of participants in the
mortgage origination process.
• Improving the liquidity provisioning by the Fed:
– The current temporary liquidity provisioning
process during those rare circumstances when
market stability is threatened should be
enhanced to ensure that:the process is calibrat-
ed and transparent; appropriate conditions are
attached to lending; and information flows to
the Fed through on-site examination or other
means as determined by the Fed are adequate.
– Second, the PWG should consider broader re-
gulatory issues associated with providing dis-
count window access to non-depository insti-
tutions.
The intermediate-term recommendations include the
following:
• Phasing out and transitioning the federal savings
and loan and mutual savings bank charters to the
national bank charter.
• Allowing for federal supervision of state-chartered
banks by placing all banking examination respon-
sibilities for state chartered banks with federal
deposit insurance with the Fed and/or FDIC.• Allowing the Fed the oversight responsibilities
for payment and settlement systems.They should
have discretion to designate a payment and set-
tlement system as systemically important and
a full range of authority to establish regulatory
standards.
• Recommendation for establishing an optional
federal charter for insurers within the current
structure.This would provide for a system of fed-
eral chartering, licensing, regulation and supervi-
sion for insurers, reinsurers and insurance pro-
ducers (i.e., agents and brokers). And Treasury
recommends that Congress establish an Office of
Insurance Oversight within Treasury to address
international regulatory issues, such as reinsur-
ance collateral and advise the Secretary of the
Treasury on major domestic and international
policy issues.
• Product and market participant convergence,
market linkages and globalization have rendered
regulatory bifurcation of the futures and securi-
ties markets untenable, potentially harmful and
inefficient. The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and the SEC should be merged to
provide unified oversight and regulation of the
futures and securities industries.
Although the Treasury proposal has not received the
attention it deserves and most certainly will not be
acted upon before a new president takes off in early
2009, it does at the very least identify some of the
reforms that need to be carefully considered in a
much needed debate to determine the most efficient
and appropriate regulation for banks operating and
competing in today’s domestic and global environ-
ment. Clearly, the complex regulatory structure that
currently exists may give the false impression to too
many individuals that crises will not occur. But even
if this is not the case, the all too frequent bail-outs
that occur after crises and the re-enforcing effect this
has on the belief that this practice will continue into
the future create moral hazard and undermine mar-
ket discipline (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2006).
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